Internet Statement 18/99  ----   June 7, 1999 
 
 
Reflexions on the Present Military Conditions of Serbia
 
 
 

By its month-long bombings of attrition, NATO seems to have obtained a basic declaration by the Yugoslav leadership about its withdrawal from Kosovo. The bombing, though, continues. Although decisive political clarifications are not existing yet, although the composition and the command of the army which is to occupy Kosovo is unclear, and although the promised UN decisions are not yet existing, and it is even questionable if they will be materialized at all, NATO by its renewed intensification of the bombings wants to force the Yugoslav military to sign an immediate withdrawal from Kosovo. NATO thinks itself instantly capable to behave how it likes in Kosovo. It is by no means excluded that it will make use of its occupation of Kosovo to build up just there an even larger army for the military control or occupation of the whole of Serbia, as the taking control of Serbia and Yugoslavia is part of the true agenda of the Kosovo war. The whole, in a suspicious way, keeps aiming in the direction of exerting pressure on Russia, and probably even more than that. 

As an observer from the outside one has, of course, to start from the fact that Serbia, a small country, is in a difficult position. It is leading a brave defence against an enormously superior power, and one has to acknowledge that Serbia must know itself how to proceed. In view of the whole way of action by NATO, however, the question poses itself if one should permit that the NATO powers continue their deployment further, as it were completely undisturbed, in order to then lead a big blow against an even more weakened Serbia. To this the whole tactics amounted. At first month-long destructive bombings until resistance is worn down, then let the invasion troops loose against a largely weakened army. Serbia‘s calculation has always aimed at a split within NATO. This is understandable, as for small Serbia, tiny as compared with NATO, this is the only chance to somehow secure a success in this war. But what would be the best way to accomplish such a split? Certainly in a situation which is concretely posing the question of the ground troops. 
A lot of countries do not want to contribute ground troops as this would render completely different their inner situation. 

Serbia absolutely would have had the right to act, for example, against elements of the deployment along its borders, in particular against all preparations of an invasion. The terror bombing by NATO is being carried through anyway, no matter how Serbia behaves in this or that single question. Maybe the Serbs ought to have concentrated more on countering NATO than on the local KLA and on retaliation. The NATO terrorists are bombing everything to pieces until they have achieved the final paralysis and the throwing down of Serbia. In this view one has to ask oneself if it would not have been better for Serbia to take a partial offensive itself, provided it had the necessery strength left.  
Under certain circumstances this even now would be still valid. 

It would be impossible to condemn Serbia for that. It goes without saying that the NATO aggressors would scream "aggressor!" if the Serbian troops were crossing a border somewhere. As they bend any truth anyway this would make no difference. A country does have the right to act in self-defence against troops at its borders in case they are being prepared for the extension on the ground of the aggression which has already been going on. Albania, for example, has longtime furthered this aggression, has been involved into the war longtime.  

These remarks which the outside observer can make are, of course, only limited. We have to admit that frankly, as making the decision how to proceed only the people which have the military insight in the theater are capable of.  

One gets the impression that essential elements of Serbia‘s military policy so far have been influenced by diplomacy and the diplomatic hope for allies in Europe. There is no doubt that the Milosevic government is under some pressure from parts of Russia‘s diplomacy, in which it has been placing its hopes already at least since the beginning of May. But those European countries which are inclined not to go to the extremes of the war will not be able to change it if the NATO-bosses, the US and Great Britain, decide a complete destruction and final occupation of Serbia. Besides, there are enough imperialist reactionaries in Germany and France who basically are party to such a line. The treaty text of the G-8 anyway has no more value any longer than for example the NATO charter which, too, interdicts a war of aggression. The G-8 is absolutely no guarantee, as NATO will go on until Serbia will have obeyed completely. 

Yugoslavia would be able to declare in the present situation that it had been ready to do everything for peace, even to withdraw from its own territory Kosovo and even to admit a NATO participation in the UN troops, that now, however, NATO insists on more, on withdrawal within a week, and refuses to limit its share in the troops. A new situation has therefore arisen. 

Editorial staff of Neue Einheit 
June 7, 1999 

Internet Statement 18/99 
 
 

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